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送交者: feiyue999 于 2006-12-03, 05:50:19:

回答: 下面几点是读羽文时,觉得羽熊疏漏的几点。 由 xinlihuaxys 于 2006-12-03, 01:27:28:

1[Xinlihuaxys注]这一句不是so...that结构。试译为:
在我看来,谈论“思维”显得很自大僭妄,我觉得这种事(按:指谈论思考)应该以证明其正当性而不是以道歉来开头。
注:这就是典型的so...that结构,原作者的意思不过是:
谈论“思维”,这样僭妄的事既然已经决定要做,首先直接说出这样做的理由要比没有实质意义的道歉更为合适。
2[Xinlihuaxys注]这一句存疑。原句后并没有问号。
无疑可存,原句有没有句号已经不影响对句意的理解了。

3[Xinlihuaxys注]to dispose of 不应为“拥有”。扔掉一批原始经验的巨大财富,而不被任何关于如何处理这些财富的事先规定所约束。
这里的dispose当然是支配,拥有的意思,很奇怪楼主如何得出
扔掉这个解释的。


4【第九页:最终的问题是感性事物和超感性事物之间的基本区分
原文:What has come to an end is the basic distinction between the sensory and the suprasensory
参考译文:达到终结的东西是感性与超感性之间的基本区分。
按:“What has come to an end”是指上文所说的已经失去实际意义并走向终结的思想方式,而非终极问题】

[Xinlihuaxys注]这一句是否说:到最后是要基本分得清感性与超感性。无上下文,不能定段。但读起来象是这个意思。

注:这句感觉原译者已经译得比较正确,要分感性与超感性,这本身是可以视为一个问题,原译无可厚非,羽熊处理得太硬。
“What has come to an end”此处意为最终的结果,
思维活动的驻足点。

5【第十四页:他仍然没有充分意识到他已经解放的理性的范围,思维的能力,并根据最终问题进行解释。
原文:He remained less than fully aware of the extent to which he had liberated reason, the ablility to think, by justifying it in terms of the ultimate questions.
参考译文:他仍然没有充分意识到他通过以最终的问题进行正当性辩护而解放出来的理性──亦即思考的能力──所朝向的范围。】

[Xinlihuaxys注]extent的理解有问题。试译为:
他仍然没有充分意识到,当他就那些终级问题来证明理性---即思考的能力---的正当性时,他解放理性的程度有多大。

注:原译和羽熊都有理解错误。
楼主这里的理解很正确,翻译处理也不错。
需要指出的只是,从搜索到的一点原文可看出,
在阿伦特看来,虽然康德本意是宣称

有必要否定知识以便为信仰留地盘

但他实际上做的却背离了自己的本意:
1 他未能为信仰留地盘,而是为思考留下了地盘
2 他并未否定知识,而只是将知识与思考作出了明确划分。

参考译文:他一直没有意识到,自己通过终极问题对理性的合法性的确立,在多大程度上使理性--思考的能力--得到了解放。


Crucial for our enterprise is Kant's distinction between Vernunft and Verstand, "reason" and "intellect" (not "understanding," which I think is a mistranslation; Kant used the German Verstand to translate the Latin intellectus, and Verstand, though it is the noun of verstehen, hence "understanding" in current translations, has none of the connotations that are inherent in the German das Verstehen). Kant drew this distinction between the two mental faculties after he had discovered the "scandal of reason," that is, the fact that our mind is not capable of certain and verifiable knowledge regarding matters and questions that it nevertheless cannot help thinking about, and for him such matters, that is, those with which mere thought is concerned, were restricted to what we now often call the "ultimate questions" of God, freedom, and immortality. But quite apart from the existential interest men once took in these questions, and although Kant still believed that no "honest soul ever lived that could bear to think that everything is ended with death," he was also quite aware that "the urgent need" of reason is both different from and "more than mere quest and desire for knowledge." Hence, the distinguishing of the two faculties, reason and intellect, coincides with a distinction between two altogether different mental activities, thinking and knowing, and two altogether different concerns, meaning, in the first category, and cognition, in the second. Kant, though he had insisted on this distinction, was still so strongly bound by the enormous weight of the tradition of metaphysics that heheld fast to its traditional subject matter, that is, to those topics which could be proved to be unknowable, and while he justified reason's need to think beyond the limits of what can be known, he remained unaware of the fact that man's need to reflect encompasses nearly everything that happens to him, things he knows as well as things he can never know. He remained less than fully aware of the extent to which he had liberated reason, the ability to think, by justifying it in terms of the ultimate questions. He stated defensively that he had "found it necessary to deny knowledge. . . to make room for faith," but he had not made room for faith; he had made room for thought, and he had not "denied knowledge" but separated knowledge from thinking.

. . . The need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning. And truth and meaning are not the same (The Life of the Mind 14-15).




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