http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,119685,00.htmlIs China Stalking Us?
Joe Buff | November 28, 2006
The close encounter between a Chinese diesel sub and the American carrier USS Kitty Hawk on October 26 near Okinawa, first reported openly in the U.S. in mid-November, has already generated quite a lot of commentary. Some of what's been said, though, seems to have had its objectivity compromised by hewing first to one or another ideology on how to interpret current post-electoral gamesmanship and geopolitics, then forcing conclusions that fit the preferred ideology. This vituperative polarization can obscure worthwhile analysis that's truly germane to U.S. national security and world peace.
China's seaward ambitions for deterrence -- both nuclear and conventional -- and for self-proclaimed regional hegemony need to be understood in the context of Beijing's own evolving, translucent (not opaque) strategic culture. The modern Song-class passive sonars are certainly good enough to know at a range of 10,000 yards that a group of big and noisy surface ships was there. No PLAN submarine captain in his right mind would surface in such conditions unless he wanted to be absolutely sure that his presence, previously undetected within the carrier's inner defense zone, was made unmistakably clear to theater U.S. admirals and their higher-ups inside the Beltway.
China is progressively drawing wider and wider deep-water redlines, warnings that her self-perceived inviolable defense interests lie thousands of miles beyond her coast, and American naval forces will in future cross those redlines at their perile.
A previous redline was signaled in 2003, when a Ming-class diesel sub transited on the surface between two of Japan's main islands in an east-to-west direction -- that is, on its way home from somewhere out in the blue Pacific. The Ming had not been previously detected despite its obsolescent design. Beijing was proving pointedly that the First Island Chain does not present an effective barrier to a surprise surge of Chinese submarines, a surge that could prove militarily decisive around 2030. On that timeframe, America's submarine fleet will have dwindled to barely 40, while China's is on a path to numbering 180 or even more by then.
Ever since the PRC first "stood up," as Mao put it, Beijing has been consistent in broadcasting its topical redlines publicly and unambiguously. But when China sees (or thinks she sees) those redlines being threatened, she prepares a counter-attack in secret and then strikes hard with no warning. This observation alone is a cause for concern.
I admire Admiral Fallon and Admiral Roughead, who've been widely quoted as favoring more open relations with Beijing, and wanting a meaningful security partnership between U.S. and Chinese forces. They have their work cut out for them, though, trying to defuse tensions with such an aggressive, opportunistic, and uncooperative opponent as the People's Republic of China.
Why do I call China our opponent when we're actively seeking partnership? First, in the context of dissuasion-and-deterrence theory and practice, China and the U.S. would be considered "opponents" just like the opposite players in tournament-level poker or chess. Further, actual PRC thinking and conduct -- domestically and on the international playing fields of economics, diplomacy, and defense -- leads me to view them as a competitive opponent in the present tense.
I've read and reread the quotes by the admirals, who've been saying similar things to Beijing since first assuming their current posts, well before the Song and Kitty Hawk encounter. I don't believe that my views and theirs are at all inconsistent. I think that the most accurate interpretation of what they've stated recently is that they're conveying/supporting U.S. government aspirations for improved interactions and friendlier communications in the near future with Beijing. Of course, this collaborative end-state is highly desirable, considering that the alternatives do include an eventual cold or hot war of some kind.
China's continuing major arms buildup should not be dismissed at all lightly, nor should their aggressive stance during and after the EP-3 mid-air collision be too easily forgotten. And I don't buy arguments offered elsewhere that China's population is aging so fast that she'll soon be impotent on the high seas, that her banking system is so corrupt and overstretched that her booming economy is due for a catastrophic tumble, and that internal unrest will impair her rapidly rising military prowess. The U.S. is aging fast too: 10 percent of China's people are now over age 60, while that figure for America is 16 percent. America had a dreadfully costly shambles in the "Savings and Loan Crisis" some years ago, yet we recovered and the stock market is at an all-time high; recessions are a normal part of any market-based system, and we certainly shouldn't throw stones when it comes to endemic corruption either. Historically, from Korea to Vietnam to Taiwan to India and elsewhere, internal unrest has made China act more violently outside her borders, not less so.
The incident of the Song sub is simply the most recent datum within a broader tapestry of Chinese unrepent martial jockeying for pride of place with America. To me, there is definitely much room for improvement in China's behavior, and a long way to go and lots to be done, before she could be considered even close to being genuine partners of the U.S. in the military sphere. There is no guarantee right now that this necessary progress will be successful. It makes total sense to strive for lasting peace, and hope to engineer a true collaboration of equals, but it's unclear whether that's what China wants. In the meantime, the best means of assuring peace is to maintain a strong and determined forward presence, not revert to some sort of appeasement or a de facto strategic withdrawal